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   Until very recently, the economic ideology that inspired Japanese industrial policy was 
neglected in social science discussions in English-speak' ng countries. It was widely believed 
that the Japanese experience of economic development had little intellectual foundation. Not 
only does every educated person in North America know that Western mainstream economics 
is largely irrelevant to the study of Japanese-type economies; even specialists in Japanese 
studies believe that "neither academic nor government economists played a major role in 
Japan's high growth strategy"1. Academia in general has long indulged in what Saito 
Seiichiro calls "a fallacious contrast between the prosperity of the Japanese economy and the 
desolation of Japanese economics"2. These perceptions may be correct in the sense that 
neoclassical economics has not exerted any notable influence on Japanese development. 
Academicians, however, have neglected the fact that a group of Japanese economists 
represented by Arisawa Hitomi (1896- 1988), Nakayama Ichiro (1898- 1980), and Tobata 
Seiichi (1899-1983), who belonged to the generation educated before the war, played a very 
important role in the state's policy making. These economists helped the nation to establish 
an urgent agenda, to identify the future direction of economic development, and to build 
theoretical framework for Japan's industrial policy in the context of international pressures 
and domestic turmoil from the 1930s to the 1960s. According to leading Japanese economist 
Komiya Ryotaro, "until about 1965, Japan's industrial policy, implemented primarily by the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, was based on the ideological groundwork laid 
by this generation"3. 
   The major propositions of these economists constituted the core of what Kanamori Hisao 
calls "Jissen-ha economics" (the economics of actual fighting)4. Jissen-ha economics reflects 
the logic of economic reasoning behind three successive paradigms of Japanese industrial 
policy: the managed economy, technological innovation and high growth. These three policy 
paradigms together represent the intellectual foundation of Japanese developmentalism - a 
distinctive set of economic ideologies on how to proceed industrialization in a late-developed 
country.
The ManagedEconomy
The managed economly was practiced in the1930s and the1940s. It was a watershed in
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the institutional development of Japanese capitalism, and marked a major departure from the 
laissez faire doctrine. The most important development in the managed economy was the 
increasing intervention of the state in the economy. Because the goal of the managed 
economy was national survival in "total war," how to mobilize the limited resources for 
military purposes when the nation was isolated from the international market became the chief 
consideration in Japanese industrial policy. Theoretically the ideology of the managed 
economy rejected the importance of private ownership and private control of the economy, as 
well as the assumption that private ownership translates into economic and political power. 
Instead of the market, the state fulfilled the function of "economic general staff," exercising 
tight control over resource allocation at the macro level. 
   Many institutions that have strongly influenced Japan's postwar development originated 
in policy innovations under the managed economy. First, the state began to control the 
behavior of private firms through excessive regulations (which have become the major target 
of reform in the 1990s), and the function of the market in organizing economic life was 
significantly constrained. In the managed economy, almost every business practice was 
subject to state regulation. Second, the state replaced the old, voluntary cartels with a new, 
involuntary system - "the associations of control" (Tosei-kai), which became an important 
instrument for achieving the state's policy objectives. Third, the state began to categorize 
firms and industries into a hierarchical order according to their importance to the national 
defense and then adopt a discriminatory policy in resource allocation. This practice was 
shared by many industrialized countries during World War II. It was a Japanese invention, 
however, to continue this discriminatory policy in resource allocation for the purpose of 
developing strategic industries in the postwar period. This has made a great difference 
between Anglo-Saxon capitalism in the United States and developmentalism in Japan. 
    The managed economy demonstrated a strong nationalist orientation through its racial 
and ethnic identity. Since the Meiji Restoration, Japan had had a tradition of "leaving Asia 
and Joining Europe." It had also experienced a long period of domestic conflict between the 
working class and capitalists. In Japanese economic ideology between World War I and the 
end of the 1920s, the Taisho democracy increased the influence of Marxism as well as 
cosmopolitanism. The leading Japanese economic ideology, however, rapidly turned inward 
after the Manchurian Incident in 1931. Under strong pressure from the international 
community following Japan's misconduct, the ideology of managed economy began to 
advocate harmony and cooperation between capital and labor and to support the national 
interrest in business operations. It rejected both Marxism, which proclaimed class struggle, 
and the laissez-faire doctrine, which regarded the profits of capitalist shareholders as the 
company's first priority. This change laid an ideological foundation for the postwar evolution 
of Japanese management because the wartime practices of assured job security and consistent 
annual wage increases were often interpreted as Japanese tradition.
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Technological Innovation 
   In the 1950s, as Japan shifted its focus from the military to wealth as the foundation of 
national power, it adopted a grand strategy of emphasizing the export of value-added heavy-
chemical products in order to achieve a strategic position in the international competition. 
The ideology of technological innovation revised the neoclassical definition of comparative 
advantage, replacing the focus on an advantage in cheap labor with emphasis on an advantage 
in production technology. Although technology had always had strategic implications for 
Japan's national security, it was of central importance in Japanese economic ideology in the 
1950s, and was perceived as Japan's only alternative to military force in international 
competition in peacetime. After they received an opportunity in the postwar period to learn 
the achievement of technological development in the United States, many Japanese concluded 
that their defeat in World War II was a result of losing the competition in technology. 
   In this new paradigm, the focus of Japanese industrial policy was shifted away from the 
effectiveness of resource allocation at the macro level, which had predominated in the 
managed economy, to efficiency of production by firms at the micro level. In the ideology of 
the managed economy, industries were perceived as supporting the military forces in wars 
among nation-states, and the state was said to act as the economic general staff in charge of 
the general mobilization of the nation. In contrast, in the new paradigm of technological 
innovation, firms rather than military forces, were perceived as the major fighters in 
international competition. Under such circumstances, according to the leading Japanese 
ideology, the state should no longer take over the function of the market. Since the winners 
and the losers in the business race had to be determined by their products, firms must promote 
their strength in market competition. The rigid control by the state on resource allocation 
would simply weaken the competitiveness of individual firms. 
   This new perception of comparative advantage in production technology led to some 
profound institutional reforms in the governance structure of the Japanese economy. The 
legacy of state intervention was modified into new forms. The bureaucratic control on 
material distribution was abolished, but the state continued to identify strategic industries and 
to allocate financial resources through its control of credit and foreign exchange to nurture 
the development of those industries. The state also played a very important role in keeping 
the market competition in strategic industries at a certain level through its antitrust policy 
and other state regulations, aiming at strengthening the competitiveness of Japanese firms 
through market competition while avoiding the waste of resources in "excessive competition." 
   The most important development in Japanese capitalism during the 1950s, however, 
occurred at the micro level. To strengthen the competitiveness of Japanese firms in the 
international market, the prewar zaibatsu business groups were reorganized into keiretsu after 
temporary dissolution during the occupation period. Centered around large commercial banks, 
these keiretsu networks provided manufacturing firms with reliable finance to promote 
production technologies through aggressive technological transfer and investment in
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production equipment. At the same time, the state supported business leaders' initiative in 
stabilizing Japan's labor relations through the productivity movement. The eventual result 
was the institutionalization of Japanese management, which was characterized by lifetime 
employment, the seniority-based wage system, and the firm-based labor union. Under the 
paradigm of technological innovation, the general principles that governed Japanese business 
operations changed profoundly. Japanese firms made a historical trade- off, giving up the 
short- term profits that had often created layoff, in exchange for labor's participation in 
promoting production technology. 
High Growth 
   In response to the strong pressure for liberalizing trade and capital investment, the 
paradigm of high growth in the 1960s redefined the role of the state in economic development. 
In the 1960s,government planning and public spending were perceived as important means to 
sustain economic development, and macro financial policy was tied directly to industrial 
policy. The aggressive public spending in the 1960s was aimed at not simply adjusting for 
market fluctuations and sustaining economic growth, but upgrading the industrial structure of 
the Japanese economy and moving quickly toward more value- added heavy- chemical 
industries. After World War II, Keynesian economics became influential in state policy in 
most industrialized countries. In the Japanese case, however, macro- economic policy was 
applied to promote the industrial structure of the economy. The Japanese state increased 
public spending on a large scale in order to induce private investment and to sustain the high 
rate of economic growth; the goal was to strengthen the Japanese competitiveness not only in 
several strategic industries, but also in the entire economy. Economic growth had been a 
national goal for many countries, but the Japanese state in the 1960s made it into a means of 
strengthening Japan's position in the international competition. 
   Another profound change in Japanese capitalism in the 1960s was the settlement of the 
"
private ordering" in the governance structure of the Japanese economy. Although the 
prevailing ideology of high growth stressed the leading role of the state in economic 
development, it focused on cooperation between the state and business, relying heavily on the 
dynamics of the private sector rather than assuming direct bureaucratic control. This was the 
outcome of a political struggle between MITI and big commercial banks. Under the pressure 
of liberalizing trade and capital investment, many Japanese were unsure whether Japanese 
firms could survive the imminent competition with foreign firms in their backyard. The 
reorganization of industry became a major concern in the policy debates in the 1960s. MITI 
bureaucrats proposed the bill titled "Special Measurement for Promoting Strategic 
Industries," in which the state would the state would be given the power to supervise each 
loan made by commercial banks according to its policy objective. This was perceived as the 
"revival of the managed economy," and was strongly resisted by the private sector. Eventually 
MITI's initiative was blocked, and the "automatic adjustment" by the private sector prevailed
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as the governance pattern for the economy. With this settlement, the influence of giant 
companies and keiretsu on the economy increased rapidly.
Marx, Schumpeter, and Keynes
   These three successive paradigms in Japanese industrial policy between the 1930s and 
the 1960s were intellectually inspired by three great thinkers in Western economics; Karl 
Marx, Joseph A. Schumpeter, and John M. Keynes. The impact of Marx, Schumpeter, and 
Keynes on Japanese economic ideology were reflected in a series of interviews conducted by 
the Toyo keizai shinposha in 1967 with eight prominent Japanese economists on their general 
views of the Japanese economy: Arisawa Hiromi, Nakayama Ichiro, Tobata Seiichi, Tsuru 
Shigeto, Shimomura Osamu, Ouchi Hyoe, Takahashi Kamekichi, and Horie Shigeo. (Most of 
these men are discussed in this study.) After these interviews, one of the interviews, Koizumi 
Akira, tried to classify their positions into three categories: the market economy, represented 
by Friedrich A. Hayek; the mixed economy, represented by John M. Keynes; and the planned 
economy, represented by Karl Marx. He found that these eight economists' theoretical 
orientations were similar to those of either Keynes or Marx, and that none favored of Hayek, 
though he had become popular with the younger generation at that time. Instead of the static 
Hayek, this generation of Japanese economists preferred the dynamic Schumpeter. Another 
interviewer, Miyazaki Yoshikazu, pointed out that the perspectives of these Japanese 
economists were either short-term Keynesian plus long-term Schumpeterian, or short-term 
Keynesian plus long-term Marxian5. What particular elements of Marx's, Schumpeter's, and 
Keynes's theories inspired the policy agendas of Japanese developmentalism in different 
periods? How did these elements together prescribe a grand strategy for Japan's 
industrialization? Most Jissen-ha economists shared the Marxian belief in economic planning. 
At the same time, however, they differed from orthodox Marxism in certain important ways. In 
contrast to the cosmopolitanism asserted by classical Marxism, for example, Arisawa Hiromi's 
version had a strong nationalist orientation; it emphasized ways to strengthen Japan in the 
competition among nation- states, especially between Western countries and non- Western 
countries. Accordingly this version focused on production force based on technology and 
often acknowledged the role of big firms in innovation, rather than emphasizing the relations 
of production and treating big firms as agents of monopoly capital. Arisawa's version of 
Marxism, moreover, prescribed the avoidance of class conflict and advocated cooperation 
between management and labor, especially when the nation was in crisis. 
   Schumpeter's idea of innovation, in the Japanese context, was no longer an academic 
concept for making sense of the dynamics of economic growth, but was perceived as a 
practical strategy to upgrade the industrial structure of the Japanese economy so as to enable 
the nation to gain a strategic position in international competition. Goto Yonosuke once 
explained in what sense he introduced Schumpeter's idea of "innovation" in the 1956 White 
Paper on the Economy. He said that "according to Schumpeter's definition, innovation refers
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to new technology, new products, new business organizations, and the creation of new 
markets. In this white paper on the economy, the meaning of innovation is further broadened. 
It suggests the modernization of Japan's economic structure"6. 
   Keynesian economics is applied in Japan as part of industrial policy to induce private 
firms to participate in innovation in order to meet the challenge of liberalizing trade and 
capital investment. Shimomura Osamu once made a clear distinction between the welfare state 
and Japanese industrial policy regarding the implications of Keynesian economics. He argued 
that the application of Keynesian economics "does not have to be limited to the economic 
situation when effective demand is needed. In that way, the issue of development is confused 
with the issue of full employment. The nature of development lies in innovation. Development 
is nurtured by promoting productivity, upgrading industrial structure, and enlightening human 
creativity. In short, it aims at paving a way for new and still higher productivity" 7. 
The Unit of Analysis: The Nation-State 
   Rejecting methodological individualism asserted by neoclassical economics, Japanese 
industrial policy takes the nation-state as its unit of analysis. Unlike Anglo-Saxon capitalism, 
which was nurtured in the cultural environment of individualism that emerged in the 
Enlightenment, Japanese industrialization was a radical response to the Western challenge in 
the mid-nineteenth century. It was a "transplant" or an "imitation," which did not include the 
laissez-faire mindset. From the very beginning, Japanese industrialization was driven to 
achieve three collective goals: to "increase production and develop industry" (shokusan kogyo ), 
to build up "a rich country and a strong army" (fukoku kyohei ), and to pursue "enlightenment 
and civilization" (bunmei kaika). In short, Japanese industrialization was motivated not by the 
wish to improve individual economic well-being, but by the desire to strengthen the national 
power in international competition. 
    The nation-state as the unit of analysis in Japanese economic ideology encountered a 
great challenge during the period of "Taisho democracy." Japan underwent rapid 
industrialization after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and the Russo-Japanese War of 
1904-1905. By the end of World War I, Japan had become one of the major powers in the Far 
East. As the power of capitalist class and political parties reached a peak, Western 
individualism and laissez faire economics also spread widely. Although they did not 
completely prevail over other perspectives in the 1920s because of the strong influence of 
Marxism, declarations favoring individual shareholders' profits were more influential in 
political discourse than before and after that time. 
   The Great Depression and the international conflicts that followed the Manchuria 
Incident of 1931 changed the Japanese economic ideology profoundly. From then on, the 
nation-state had remained the unit of analysis in Japanese economic ideology until the end of 
the 1960s. This transformation reflected the changing historical environment. Assuming the 
inevitable military confrontation between Japan and Western powers, the managed economy 
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was driven by the cocern for national survival in total war. The large- scale investment in 
equipment and the stabilization of labor relations in the 1950s were aimed at achieving 
economic independence for Japan by building comparative advantage in production 
technology and promoting exports in heavy-chemical industries. A fundamental concern in the 
high growth policy in the 1960s was to ensure Japan's position in international competition 
by improving infrastructure, promoting human capital, and upgrading industrial structure in 
the face of liberalization of trade and capital investment. The nation-state is the starting point 
in understanding Japanese economic ideology. Without this reference, many policy outcomes 
and institutional developments may be misinterpreted. This is why Daniel Okimoto argues 
that "the secret to Japan's apparent success lies in the overall system within which industrial 
policy functions. It is the dynamic combination of factors, interacting within the structure of 
an integrated system, that gives shape to the apparent effectiveness of Japanese industrial 
policy". 
The Preference of End: The National Power of Production 
   The preference of end in Japanese industrial policy is to build the national power of 
production. It emphasizes the long-term effectiveness of reaching goals, rather than the short-
term efficiency of utility maximization. Lester Thurow once called the Japanese logic the 
"producer economics"9. 
   The implications of this producer economics varied. The ideology of the managed 
economy, according to Arisawa Hiromi "regards the public interest as more important than 
individual interest, and does not allow the practice of treating profit and individual interest as 
the first priority in economic activity"10. It was believed that "a laissez-faire economy based 
on the profit principle cannot integrate economic laws with ethics. Therefore the profit 
principle of the laissez-faire economy must be suppressed in order to make internal integration 
possible"11 
   In the 1950s, it was thought that Japan is an island country with few national resources, 
and the operation of the Japanese economy inevitably depends upon trade. Without trade, 
both domestic production and employment will decrease, the economic cycle will be very 
small, and the Japanese people's standard of living cannot be sustained at a reasonable level. 
For these reasons, Japanese firms must aggressively pursue the advantage in production 
technology, disregarding the significance of short-term profit to business operationsl2. 
   Under the external pressure to liberalize trade and capital investment, the high growth 
policy in the 1960s extended the focus on the national power of production from the level of 
industry to the level of the entire economy. The National Income Doubling Plan declared that 
Japan must improve the infrastructure, promote trade, and develop human capital, science, and 
technology. As Shimomura Osamu remarked, high growth in Japan did not simply mean 
economic growth at a high rate. Rather, it implied the real promotion of productivity by 
rationalizing the production process and investing in production equipment13 
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   The emphasis on building the national power of production had a profound effect on the 
Japanese economy, and this "producer economics" had a dark side. During the process of 
Japanese industrialization, the ambition to build a "rich country" required many sacrifices by 
individuals. For a long time, as many critics pointed out, issues of individual rights, social 
welfare, consumer protection, and environmental protection received little attention in the 
ideology of Japanese developmentalism. As a result, improvement in the standard of living 
during the high growth period lagged far behind the pace of economic growth itself. Even in 
the 1990s, the quality of living in Japan is still not compatible with the country's GNP. 
Instrumental Means: The State, Business Networks, and Japanese Management 
   To facilitate the goal of building the national power of production through 
industrialization, Japanese economic ideology emphasized three instrumental means: the state, 
business groups, and Japanese management. 
   The state has been perceived by Jissen-ha economists as a "precondition" for sustaining 
industrialization in a late-developed country: capital expected the state to support the 
development of heavy-chemical industries, while labor demanded social legislation. The state, 
they contended, not only should act as an "entrepreneur," but also should take "political 
responsibility" for both economic growth and social stability14. This "developmental state," 
Chalmers Johnson argues, gave the greatest precedence to industrial policy. It provided 
businesses with the support and guidance they needed in an effort to upgrade the industrial 
structure of the Japanese economy and to enhance the nation's competitiveness in the global 
market15. The frequent state intervention in Japan, however, by no means indicates that the 
state intends to replace the function of the market. The leadership of the Japanese state in 
economic development does not preclude the role of the private sector. The real goal of 
Japanese industrial policy, Murakami Yasusuke argued, is to provide private firms with strong 
incentives to compete in strategic industries, while keeping the competition in these 
industries at a certain level by discouraging excessive incentives in order to avoid wasting 
limited resources. In other words, the state relied upon the market to strengthen the 
competitiveness of Japanese firms. At the same time, however, the state does not allow the 
market forces to run their own course, but guides these forces to serve its own policy agenda. 
The goal of Japanese industrial policy agenda. The goal of Japanese industrial policy is to 
sustain and guide market competition in the long run, rather than to replace market 
competition with bureaucratic control 16. Keiretsu has been recognized as a distinctive pattern 
of business organization in Japan. The interfirm relations, according to Ronald Dore, 
comprise two types of "relational contracting," one between unequal forces and the other 
between equals 17. The rational nature of this arrangement, according to the Weberian 
approach, lies in its "effective regulation of conduct depending... upon the strong common 
purpose of the group," excluding "outsiders" in an effort to reduce uncertainty in economic 
exchange 18. From the viewpoint of Japanese industrial policy, the cost resulting from 
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competition sometimes may be greater than the profit. When numerous small firms compete 
with each other in the market, their profits will decline, and the capital return may become 
negative throughout the industry. More important, excessive competition will cause capital 
and labor to be concentrated in one industry more than is necessary; in the end, competition 
may not create the most efficient production system for the Japanese economy19. Since 
production technology and economy of scale are the most important factors in making 
Japanese firms competitive in the international market, Japan must enlarge the heavy-
chemical firms and strengthen the integration between firms in R & D, investment, and 
cooperation in order to create companies that can compete internationally in strategic 
industries. 
    Japanese management has been perceived as another major instrumental means of 
promoting the national power of production. In Anglo-Saxon capitalism, the financial market 
functions as the major means by which individual shareholders generate profits, while the 
labor market enables individual workers to improve their incomes and other economic welfare. 
In Japanese capitalism, in contrast, both markets play a marginal role: the financial markets 
provides less opportunity to maximize profits, while the Jabor markets does little to promote 
social mobility20. Japanese management, characterized by lifetime employment, the seniority-
based salary, and firm-based unions, represents principles fundamentally different from Anglo-
Saxon principles regarding who owns the firm and how rights, responsibilities, benefits, risks, 
and information are distributed among parties affiliated with the firm21. The true nature of 
Japanese management is as an organizational arrangement to sustain the efforts of building 
the national power of production by linking technological innovation and promotion of 
productivity directly to the gains generated from these activities according to an agreed-upon 
arrangement between the firm and labor. The practices of lifetime employment and the 
seniority-based wage reflected the Japanese managers' intention to "get rid of the arbitrariness 
of the old capitalism, which follows the urge to pursue short-term profits"22. The Japanese 
state had long ago adopted a labor policy favoring firms. In light of liberalization of trade and 
capital investment, it shifted its policy toward labor in the early 1960s and began to "take a 
neutral position on the issues concerning labor relations and represent the interest of the 
nation by mediating competing interests"23. 
Another Way of Economic Thinking 
   Jissen-ha economics not only stands as an alternative theory of industrialization to 
neoclassical economics; it also resembles the tradition of the German historical school in the 
history of economic thought regarding research methodology. 
   Murakami Yasusuke pointed out that the fundamental difference between neoclassical 
economics and Japanese developmentalism is that capitalism as a subject for research in the 
former is an ahistorical concept, while industrialization in the latter is historical24. 
Neoclassical economics focuses on a particular aspect of virtually all of human behavior and 
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investigates facts and discovers truths about them. In contrast, Japanese devolopmentalism 
emphasizes the concrete processes of production, distribution, exchange, and consumption of 
goods and services. For this reason, Japanese developmentalism rejects neoclassical 
economists' claim that economic laws are universal, and insists on the relativity of economic 
theories. This view is consistent with Veblen's proposition that economics is an evolutionary 
science because the conditions of economic life are subject to variation. Most Jissen-ha 
economists belonged to either Marukei or kinkei by academic definition, but in regard to policy 
issues they could overcome the ideologial restrictions of a single economic doctrine, and 
borrowed selectively whatever proved useful. 
   Moreover, neoclassical economics derives economic laws methodologically through 
logical and mathematical deduction, disregarding the ethnographic facts about human 
behavior in any given society and the cross-cultural data about any economic system25. Once 
these logical principles are derived by introspection, they become the axioms from which the 
"data" and the "facts" about others societies are to be "generated" or deduced. Produced in 
this way, models in neoclassical economics are inevitably derivative and universal26. In 
contrast, the major theoretical propositions of Jissen-ha economics were derived through 
induction. They were based on empirical studies of economic reality and were concerned with 
the timely issues confronted by the Japanese economy. 
   Neoclassical economics is based on methodological individualism and explains macro 
economic phenomena as an aggregation of individual behaviors. In this sense, neoclassical 
economics is influenced by the "physics imperialism" that emerged in the nineteenth century; 
methodological individualism simply resembles the method of atomization in physics27. 
Japanese developmentalism, in contrast, inherited the tradition of the German historical 
school. It treats economic phenomena institutionally, emphasizing how the nation-state 
increases its wealth through promoting the power of production by employing a state 
industrial policy, business networks, and Japanese management. 
    Finally, unlike neoclassical economics, which claims to be value-free, Japanese 
developmentalism regards the economy as a social system that has ethics. For this reason, the 
description by John Neville Keynes (the father of John M. Keynes) of the characteristics of 
the German historical school is also a precise summary of the standing propositions of 
developmentalism in Japan: "The school explicitly calls itself ethical; it regards political 
economy as having a high ethical task, and as concerned with the most important problems of 
human life. The science is not merely to classify the motives that prompt economic activity; it 
must also weigh and compare their moral merit. It must determine a standard of the right 
production and distribution of welfare, such that the demands of justice and morality may be 
satisfied. It must set forth an ideal of economic development, having in view the intellectual 
and moral, as well as the merely material, life; and it must discuss the ways and means -
such as the strengthening of right motives, and the spread of sound customs and habits in 
industrial life, as well as the direct intervention of the state - by which that ideal is to be 
sought after"28. 
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A Research Subject for Comparative Capitalism 
   As communism collapsed in the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries in 
1989, Francis Fukuyama cheered the "end of history", predicting that there no longer exists 
any ideology to compete with the liberal capitalism29. What has emerged on the intellectual 
horizon since then, however, is not the "ultimate tirumph" of laissez-faire doctrine, but an 
emerging research agenda of comparative capitalism. This agenda is oriented strongly toward 
a theory of capitalism alternative to neoclassical economics. It reflects a serious effort to 
search for a new order for the international economy in this post coldwar era. As the Japanese 
type of capitalism has been, is and will be practiced by many countries in an increasingly 
interdependent global economy, the theoretical foundation of Japanese industrial policy 
deserves serious study. Although the triumph of the Japanese economy prescribed by these 
economic ideas has become history with the passage of time, the logic and the reasoning 
contained in Japanese developmentalism have been incorporated into modern economic 
institutions, and stand before us as clues for exploring the nature of Japanese capitalism. As 
David Williams asserts, "history will not end until Japan, and much of East Asia with her, is 
made to conform to this new consensus. Until this happens, the world will stand beyong the 
end of history regardless of what has happened in Eastern Europe"3o
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